

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.201
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ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 23 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

(Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics)

64-17316

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. V. PECHOTA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU

Mr. P. MATEESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH

Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

Mr. M.N. SHELEPIN

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

United Kingdom:

Mr. Peter THOMAS

Sir Paul MASON

Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

Mr. A.J. WILLIAMS

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Mr. S. de PALMA

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare open the two hundred and first meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): Permit me first of all to give a cordial welcome to our colleagues the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Kurka, and the representative of Poland, Mr. Lobodycz, and to tell them that we highly appreciate their useful participation in our work.

I doubt whether there is any other question relating to disarmament on which unanimity has been expressed so clearly in numerous resolutions of the United Nations and in statements by the most responsible leading statesmen, as on the question of stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons. This gives us reason to hope that the Committee will be able at this session to achieve concrete, positive results in this regard.

The question of stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons has the following peculiarity in comparison with all the other measures which are the subject of our discussions: if we do not succeed now or in the immediate future in achieving progress in regard to other collateral measures, we can continue our efforts, and probably sooner or later we shall achieve concrete results in respect of some of these measures. But if we fail to achieve progress now or in the immediate future on the question of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, we shall risk setting back the prospects of successful negotiations not only on this question but also on the question of disarmament in general.

In other words, the absence of an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons will not only hamper but may even block for an indefinite period the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. This characteristic of the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons determines its urgency and its extreme importance. At the same time it emphasizes with particular force the necessity of not taking actions likely to complicate the solution of this problem, of not taking measures which would not only make the negotiations more difficult but which would deprive in advance a possible agreement of any practical value. The Bulgarian

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delegation wishes to emphasize the heavy responsibility of States and governments which at the present time are taking actions and steps that inevitably bar the way to an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

It must be admitted that we find ourselves in what I would call a paradoxical situation. All delegations recognize the need to find as quickly as possible a solution to the question of non-dissemination; moreover, the most responsible statesmen recognize the great danger of a further spread of nuclear weapons and stress the urgent need to bar the way to nuclear contagion; lastly, as I have already emphasized, the United Nations has several times unanimously appealed for urgent measures to be taken in this regard. Nevertheless, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is still not in a position to begin the practical preparation of such an agreement as would close all paths to nuclear weapons for States not yet possessing them.

The logical question arises: why is this so?

It should be noted that a careful study of the statements made by the delegations of the Western countries and, in particular, the statement by the United States delegation at the 195th meeting of the Committee, as well as Mr. Timberlake's remarks at the 199th meeting, is, I regret to say, unlikely to make us particularly optimistic. Judging by those statements, one can draw the conclusion that the Western Powers are not prepared to eliminate the only obstacle which is really blocking an agreement on this question at the present time -- an obstacle which threatens to nullify all the efforts, everything positive achieved so far in the work of bringing the positions of the sides closer together.

What in fact does the position of the Western countries boil down to on the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons? Actually this position boils down to the following extremely odd opinion. They agree that the granting of control or possession of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear Powers would be dangerous and undesirable; they agree that an international agreement should be concluded. But they do not agree to renounce the commitments which they have undertaken in regard to certain of their allies: that is, the Western countries do not agree that the general rules governing the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons should be compulsory for the NATO military and political bloc. Consequently nothing remains for all the other countries but to accept yet another fait accompli and put up with it.

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Such a situation cannot fail to arouse disquiet among those who are sincerely striving to prevent the spread of the nuclear disease on such a scale as would transform it into a world-wide epidemic. A policy of faits accomplis has always been a dangerous one. In any case, if such a policy is followed in regard to disarmament negotiations in general, and in regard to negotiations on the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons in particular, the prospects for our work cannot be other than gloomy.

The most recent events confirm once again the indisputable truth that the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and the grave danger inherent in the spread of these weapons cannot be discussed in an abstract way: that is, without taking into consideration a number of concrete facts of international reality which have a direct bearing on this question. Therefore we cannot agree with the assertion of some that remarks concerning the only real obstacle standing in the way of an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons have no connexion with our discussion and are likely to hinder a successful outcome to our negotiations.

It is no secret to members of this Committee, or to anyone outside these walls, where the real danger now lies of creating insuperable obstacles in the way of an agreement on the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. It lies in the plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force. Incidentally, it seems that this name could and should have been made more precise long ago: it simply relates to a "United States/Federal Republic of Germany" nuclear force -- that is, the granting to Western Germany of control over nuclear weapons with all the dangerous consequences entailed thereby for the cause of disarmament and peace throughout the world.

The Bulgarian delegation considers that the facts contained in the Note addressed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 11 July (ENDC/137) deserve the closest attention of the members of our Committee. It can only be regretted that the warnings about the grave danger connected with the creation of the "United States/Federal Republic of Germany" nuclear force have so far been ignored by the United States Government. The facts set forth in the Soviet Government's Note show that events are taking an extremely dangerous course. Everything possible is being done to get the creation of the NATO multilateral nuclear force beyond the phase of planning and negotiations so as to reach the phase of practical implementation as quickly as possible.

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In the light of these facts, what value can be attached to the statements of the West about good intentions or to the appeals to hasten the conclusion of an agreement to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons? We all agree that it is necessary to hasten; but we must also agree that it is necessary to hasten in the right direction: towards an effective stopping of dissemination, and not towards the actual dissemination of nuclear weapons accompanied merely by appeals for the conclusion of an agreement.

In this regard, the Bulgarian delegation has studied with interest and due attention the statement made by the United Kingdom representative at the meeting of the Committee held on 2 July. We must say quite frankly that we were unable fully to grasp Sir Paul Mason's logic when at the same meeting he said:

"Even were ... misgivings about the multilateral force well founded -- which, of course, they are not --, surely that is an argument for pressing on with the early conclusion of a non-dissemination agreement rather than for hanging back." (ENDC/PV.195, p.17)

The United Kingdom representative added:

"Once we have reached agreement on the subject of non-dissemination, ... surely it is clear that any subsequent arrangements which we in NATO may arrive at for our mutual defence would have to be in conformity with the agreement on non-dissemination." (ibid.)

If one accepts without reservation this statement that the misgivings about the creation of the NATO multilateral force are unfounded, it seems that Sir Paul Mason is appealing for haste in order to outstrip certain events. We are being asked to participate in a kind of sprinting competition. As a guarantee that we -- that is, all those who are interested in achieving an effective agreement on the prevention of dissemination -- shall win the competition, the United Kingdom representative points to the fact that "the United Kingdom has not yet decided to join the multilateral force" (ibid.). Obviously, if we have understood Sir Paul Mason's thought correctly, the United Kingdom will not join this force if it is convinced that that would mean the dissemination of nuclear weapons or, to be more precise, making nuclear weapons available to Western Germany. But, as Sir Paul Mason pointed out, the United Kingdom believes a priori that the misgivings in this regard are unfounded. Moreover, Sir Paul Mason spoke about "subsequent agreements which we in NATO may arrive at for our mutual defence" (ibid.). What "subsequent agreements" are concerned?

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Judging by the statements of Mr. Foster and Mr. Timberlake, the United States adheres to the view that the multilateral nuclear force is necessary for the defence purposes of the North Atlantic Pact, and that demands for the renunciation of this force are an encroachment upon the "defence" arrangements of NATO. Consequently, it is obvious that the United States and certain of its allies consider the multilateral nuclear force already a fait accompli, or at least they consider its creation inevitable; and in that case the arguments put forward in support of the view that this does not mean the dissemination of nuclear weapons are merely aimed at what is called "shifting the blame from the guilty to the innocent".

We should like to point out that the statements made by responsible United Kingdom leaders according to whose opinion the United Kingdom has not undertaken any commitments regarding possible participation in the multilateral force are in themselves encouraging. These statements bear witness to certain fears which, as is well known, are shared by a number of other European and non-European States members of NATO, as well as by influential political circles in the United Kingdom and in other countries. The aforesaid States members of NATO and political circles have expressed themselves against the creation of a multilateral nuclear force, and do not in any case believe that the absence of such a force constitutes any threat to their security. Rather they see such a threat precisely in the creation of this force, and particularly in the possibilities which such an action will open up for giving access to nuclear weapons to the West German revenge-seekers and militarists.

The expression which I have just used, "West German revenge-seekers and militarists", compels me to open a parenthesis and tell those Western colleagues who ask us to look "through their eyes" --- or rather, to pretend that we see in Western Germany only innocent angels --- that no one invented either the West German Minister Mr. Seehofer or his territorial claims regarding Czechoslovakia. Another actual fact is the denial by Bonn according to which the Bonn Government has no territorial claims on Czechoslovakia but demands the re-establishment of the German frontiers of 1937 --- that is, it lays claim to Soviet and Polish territories. Lastly, no one invented the report and article by Rear-Admiral Heye, who as parliamentary inspector of the Bundeswehr has brought out into the daylight the truth about the resurrection of the old spirit --- that is, the Teutonic and Hitlerite spirit --- in the army of present-day Western Germany. Without citing other facts, I will close the parenthesis and leave it to the defenders themselves of the aforesaid West Germans to qualify these facts.

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At the beginning of 1964, when we resumed our work, wishes were voiced and confidence was expressed by many delegations that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would be able to achieve substantial results along the path paved by the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). There is no doubt that the problem which has become ripe for solution -- the solution of which is literally knocking at our door -- is that of stopping the dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is absolutely necessary that all the countries concerned should make the utmost efforts to seek for a solution to this problem. The delegations of the Western countries often appeal for a realistic approach to problems. But everyone who has a realistic approach to the problem of non-dissemination is bound to accept as indisputable the following propositions, which are of essential importance for the solution of this problem.

First, an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons must contain provisions which preclude any possibility of non-nuclear Powers gaining possession or control of nuclear weapons.

In this regard it seems to us that certain delegations are again having recourse to a peculiar interpretation of the well-known Irish resolution; and in any case they very carefully avoid quoting one part, or, more precisely, one phrase of the operative part of that resolution: namely, that an international agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons should contain --

"... provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons" (A/RES/1665 (XVI))

In his statement in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 30 November 1961, the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland, Mr. Aiken, in connexion with the adoption of the draft resolution proposed by him, stated:

"I should like to point out that ... the nuclear Powers ... have abided by the spirit of the resolutions adopted at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly and have not transferred control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States. It is well known that some of the nuclear States have been under pressure to give nuclear weapons to their non-nuclear allies. And for their successful resistance I warmly congratulate them ..." (A/C.1/PV.1208, pp. 46, 47)

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Secondly, there exists pressure, a definite and open striving by one of the NATO allies of the United States to obtain control over nuclear weapons. In this regard numerous facts have been cited which have not been and cannot be refuted. The desire of Bonn to obtain control over nuclear weapons is not denied by the Western Powers themselves, which assure us that the creation of the NATO multilateral nuclear force is allegedly the only way of resisting pressure by the Federal Republic of Germany to equip the Bundeswehr with its own nuclear weapons.

Thirdly, the creation of the so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force, irrespective of how it was originally planned, will mean in practice the creation of a "United States/Federal Republic of Germany" nuclear force.

Fourthly, the creation of a multilateral nuclear force is a first but a sure step along the road to the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

In confirmation of this, numerous facts have been cited which have not been, and also cannot be, refuted. Allow me to recall the opinion of a competent Western specialist, expressed at a time when the plans to set up the multilateral nuclear force were still in embryo. Albert Wohlstetter wrote in the United States review Foreign Affairs:

"In many indirect as well as direct ways ... the NATO strike force seems more likely to be a step along the way to diffusion than a means to inhibit it. Both its military and its political worth are more than doubtful." (Foreign Affairs, Vol.39, No.3, p.377)

How the multilateral nuclear force is looked upon in Western Germany itself is also well known. It is worth while to refer to the point of view of the Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic, Mr. von Hassel, which was expressed in the United States review Foreign Affairs. Commenting on the "wise" decision to set up the multilateral nuclear force, Mr. von Hassel stated:

"The decisive aspect of the project for a Multilateral Force is the chance which it offers to make the use of nuclear weapons a common Allied responsibility. This objective may be remote at present. But the negotiations indicate wider possibilities of political and military co-operation within the Alliance." (ibid., Vol.42, No.2, p.188)

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This statement by Mr. von Hassel is in itself sufficiently clear and requires no comment. But it becomes clearer still if we compare it with a document such as the well-known Bundeswehr memorandum of 20 August 1960, and with another statement by the same Mr. von Hassel which appeared in the pages of the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine:

"From the moment the multilateral force becomes a really important military weapon, it is essential to demand of the Americans that they renounce the right of veto. In order to use the force at the military and political level, it is necessary to accept as the basis the principle that decisions will be taken by a majority vote."

That the political and military leaders of Bonn know how to insist on and obtain step by step what they are striving for seems to us to be clear to everyone. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has succeeded in securing the removal one after another of a number of restrictions placed upon the armed forces of Western Germany by the Paris Agreements of 1954. Mr. von Hassel is already saying now, before the multilateral force has been created, that it is necessary to demand of the Americans equality in decisions concerning the use of the nuclear weapons of NATO. Can it be doubted that this will lead, step by step, to the Bundeswehr having direct control and its own nuclear weapons? As was pointed out in the Soviet Government's Note of 11 July:

"It is not difficult to see how illusory are the hopes of those who believe that the creation of the NATO multilateral force would be the 'last' concession to West German militarists and revenge-seekers." (ENDC/137, p.2)

Fifthly, it is impossible to combine the creation of the NATO multilateral nuclear force with the solution of the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons; it is impossible to solve the problem of the non-dissemination of these weapons without putting an end to the plan to create a multilateral nuclear force. As the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi, pointed out on 19 March:

"... in any case the creation of the multilateral nuclear force would certainly result in the proliferation of nuclear armaments ..."

(ENDC/PV.176, p.15)

The representative of the United Arab Republic, speaking at our meeting of 9 April on the subject of the multilateral nuclear force and the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons stated for his part:

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"... but whatever could be the reasons, whether political or strategic, we feel that the best way to ensure peace and security in our world is to prevent any accessibility to nuclear weapons and therefore avoid complicating further the already complex task of reaching any agreement on disarmament." (ENDC/PV.182, p.8)

At the present time the peoples and governments are faced with a very crucial question: are the Governments of the nuclear Powers prepared to conclude an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons which would really close all channels and possibilities for the further dissemination of these weapons?

The position of the Government of the Soviet Union was set forth with the utmost clarity at our meeting of 2 July. I venture to remind you of the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union:

"If the Western Powers are really anxious for a positive solution of the problem of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, we are prepared to negotiate on this problem without putting forward any preliminary conditions. However, from the very beginning there must be mutual understanding between us on the main thing: that our common aim is to conclude such an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as would preclude any possibility for their dissemination, and would close every loop-hole of access to these weapons to those who do not now possess them but are striving at all costs to gain direct or at least indirect access to them, either by establishing their own national control over nuclear weapons or by participating within the framework of military alliances in the possession, disposal, and control of nuclear weapons."

(ENDC/PV.195, p.15)

The Bulgarian delegation believes that this approach of the Soviet Union to the solution of one of the most acute international problems of today is not only realistic but the only approach likely to ensure the success of the negotiations on the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. As has also been pointed out by other delegations, any action which would lead to a change in the existing situation in regard to nuclear weapons would confront the world with a new situation and would result in yet another great opportunity being missed and would place all of us, nuclear and non-nuclear, small and great Powers, in a situation from which there might be no return.

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The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is convinced that it is not yet too late to eliminate the obstacles preventing the solution of the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, that it is not yet too late for the Western nuclear Powers, bearing in mind the great responsibility they face, to refrain from actions and steps that are likely to complicate and even render doubtful the success of the disarmament negotiations.

The problem which we are discussing affects the vital interests of all countries and all peoples. Consequently efforts must be made by all countries and all governments, and in the first place, of course, by all the countries represented in the Committee on Disarmament.

As was stated in the Soviet Government's Note of 11 July:

"On this matter ... there are only two possible positions which must be clearly distinguished from one another -- either actively to follow the principle of preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons in any form or to take the course of making these weapons available to other States, and then the question of the form and the manner in which they are made available has no serious significance. But those who take the second course would inevitably have to reckon with the dangerous consequences to which this might lead for the cause of peace and, not least, for themselves." (ENDC/137, pp. 3, 4)

It only remains to hope that the responsible leaders of the West will consider with due attention and a sense of responsibility the warnings not only of the socialist countries but of the peoples of the whole world, including public opinion in their own countries.

Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): First of all, my delegation wishes to associate itself with the others in extending a hearty welcome to Mr. Thomas of the United Kingdom, Mr. Lobodycz of Poland, and Mr. Kurka of Czechoslovakia, who have rejoined us today.

The subject before us today -- non-dissemination of nuclear weapons -- is one which the Mexican delegation has very much at heart. The firm position which the Mexican Government has invariably taken in this question is well known to the whole

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world, and we feel that this meeting is a suitable occasion to repeat it, particularly as certain very recent events and reactions involving the major nuclear Powers render the problem even more acute than it has been for the last twenty years, since the beginning of what is commonly known as the atomic era.

We are on the eve of the nineteenth anniversary of that fateful day -- 6 August 1945 -- when the first atomic bomb wiped out in an instant 300,000 human beings in the Hiroshima area, of whom 60,000 were literally burnt to death, the remainder dying in the subsequent conflagration or through the contamination of radioactive fallout. And that horrible slaughter, the memory of which still fills us with horror and consternation, was caused by a bomb of a mere 20 kilotons -- a baby bomb, as it were, compared with those manufactured later as atomic fission and fusion procedures were perfected.

It would certainly be utopian to want to put the clock back to the pre-atomic era; it would not even be desirable, for the nuclear energy which was finally liberated by human ingenuity will one day, when applied to peaceful uses, be the driving force of human progress -- according to the experts the only one on which mankind can rely in the not too distant future. While reserves of minerals and hydrocarbons, including those under the ocean bed, will according to some authorities last at the most seventy years, reserves of fissionable materials appear to be sufficient to meet energy demands for several hundreds of thousands of years.

Our task is not to cancel out this formidable invention, which like all its fellows is irreversible, but to channel it along the path of welfare and progress -- the only path which truly deserves that name -- blocking the other path of destruction or, more precisely, annihilation. This will not come about until the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons are absolutely outlawed; hence we gladly endorse the words in which the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden replied on 16 February 1962 to the enquiry made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in compliance with resolution A/RES/1664 (XVI):

"The ultimate goal should obviously be to free the whole world from nuclear weapons. The Swedish Government would with the greatest satisfaction welcome a universal agreement which would effectively ban nuclear weapons and prevent their manufacture, stockpiling and use."

(DC/201/Add.2, p.69)

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Not only the non-aligned Powers but also the major nuclear Powers gave substantially identical replies to the enquiry. Thus the United States Government said:

"With regard to the position of the United States, the question of dissemination of nuclear weapons appears to fall logically into two categories: (1) the manufacture or acquisition of ownership of nuclear weapons, and (2) the deployment of nuclear weapons. With respect to the manufacture or ownership of nuclear weapons, the concern of my Government to prevent the proliferation of such weapons has been made clear by its actions. Both United States legislation and policy severely limit United States transfer of weapons information to other countries; United States policy opposes the development of national nuclear weapons capability by any additional nation. United States legislation precludes transfer of ownership or control of such weapons to other States. This legislation has been a keystone in the nuclear weapons policy of the United States." (ibid., p.84)

The Soviet Union said:

"The Soviet Union wishes to reaffirm that it considers it important, in order to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, that an agreement should be concluded between States whereby countries not possessing nuclear weapons should enter into an undertaking not to manufacture such weapons, not to acquire them from Powers who do possess them, and not to permit them to be sited in their territory. The Soviet Union, for its part, is ready to enter into an undertaking not to deliver nuclear weapons or information concerning their manufacture to other countries, if the United States, the United Kingdom and France will enter into identical undertakings. The Soviet Government considers that there is no justification for postponing the conclusion of such an agreement." (ibid., p.80)

Thus there seems to be firm agreement in principle on this matter; it is also agreed that non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is a collateral measure which would lead to the total abolition of these weapons of mass destruction and the elimination of war material of this type, to paraphrase resolution 808 (IX), which was

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adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1954 and continues to be our guiding star.

So long as it is not feasible to carry that out, we may regard as a safety device, or at least as a protection against greater evils, the non-dissemination of that supreme vehicle of death -- death en masse, of entire peoples or countries; death without discrimination of age or sex, combatants or non-combatants; for its grim logic entails the abolition of those distinctions which today appear to be obsolete but which in the era of conventional wars were dictated by elementary feelings of humanity. It is monstrous that war should have been outlawed in legal texts while the possibility of total war grows apace through the unchecked nuclear arms race.

The following words, spoken by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ireland, Mr. Aiken, in his speech of 6 November 1962 at the First Committee of the General Assembly, have since acquired even greater urgency:

"In the present tense state of the world situation, with the balance of terror teetering on its base, it is more than ever of vital importance that the nuclear Powers should refrain from upsetting that balance by spreading nuclear weapons to further countries ...

"I would appeal to the nuclear Powers to separate at once this problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons from all other problems which confront them and to deal with it as the most urgent and the most serious danger facing us all." (A/C.1/PV.1267, pp. 58-60, 61)

Believing that an undertaking by nuclear Powers not to transmit weapons of that type to other Powers must be accompanied by a similar undertaking on the part of the latter not to receive them, the Mexican Government has taken the initiative of unilaterally proclaiming, in full exercise of its sovereignty, its firm decision to that effect, and has made it known to the world on all appropriate occasions.

For the most solemn and conspicuous statements of the Mexican position, I need only quote from the speech delivered on the instructions of President López Mateos in this Committee by Mr. Manuel Tello, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the ministerial meeting of 22 March 1962:

"In our view, pending the attainment of world-wide agreement, denuclearization could, can and should be brought about through voluntary and free decisions by

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"States. Thus, the Mexican Government has resolved neither to possess nor to admit to its national territory nuclear weapons of any sort or any vehicles that might be used for their delivery. While we, of course, lack the technical or economic resources to take such action, our attitude would be the same even if that were not the case." (ENDC/PV.7, p.8)

Secondly, in reply to the enquiry carried out by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in compliance with the above-mentioned resolution 1664 (XVI), among non-nuclear countries regarding the conditions under which they could assume the undertaking, the Mexican position upheld in this Committee was reiterated, and it was further stated:

"... the Government of Mexico would be unconditionally prepared to assume, as a contractual obligation, an undertaking to refrain from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons or from receiving them in its territory, provided that the other States agreed to be bound in identical terms."

(DC/204/Add.1, p.16)

In accordance with this statement, in which Mexico took the important step -- I do not think we are boasting -- of elevating a unilateral declaration, liable at all times to modification by the issuing government, and in any event by subsequent administrations, to the lofty rank of an international treaty, and believing that the attainment of our objective on a world-wide scale could be furthered by the immediate application of this step on a regional scale, the Mexican Government began negotiations with the Latin-American countries that had sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.312, which had been submitted in the Political Committee of the General Assembly at the seventeenth session and which had substantially the same aim.

As a result of these negotiations the Governments of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico issued on 29 April 1963 the "Declaration on the Denuclearization of Latin America". The Heads of State of the other Latin-American Republics were invited to accede to it. I shall merely quote the following operative paragraph in which the five Presidents agree -

"To announce forthwith that their Governments are prepared to sign a Latin American multilateral agreement by which the countries would undertake not to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons or nuclear launching devices". (ENDC/87)

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Lastly, I do not think it would be irrelevant if I were to mention the following remarks made by President López Mateos when communicating the Declaration to the Mexican people, and when commenting on it in a personal letter to the Heads of State who were its co-sponsors. In his message to the nation the First Magistrate of Mexico said:

"In the present cold war situation, in which the major Power groupings confront each other every minute of the day from their respective positions of strength, it is incumbent on our country to act as a moderating influence."

In his personal letter to the Heads of State, President López Mateos said:

"We are living in dramatic times in which each and every one of us -- but especially we Heads of State whose task it is to speak for our peoples -- must firmly and constantly conduct ourselves with the preservation of humanity in mind."

These have always been the twin aspects -- complementary, not contradictory -- of Mexican policy in this field. On the one hand, we are "firmly and constantly" seeking by all the means in our power to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, since otherwise it would become more and more difficult for the major nuclear States to retain the power of decision as to their use -- a terrifying hypothesis, but one which we must keep in mind. Has no one yet pointed out, among other horrible things, that that terrible first weapon of 20 kilotons could be used for tactical purposes, even in local wars, when originally it had been said as justification that it had only been used as a result of an extraordinary strategic decision, in order to accelerate the end of the Second World War in one of its most important theatres?

Is it not frightening that our consciences should have become so hardened or deformed as to want to transform a conventional into a nuclear war, whatever the supposed limitations? We do not recognize any of these subtle distinctions in what we regard as a direct threat on a gigantic scale to innocent lives; since, whatever the scale of values accepted by sane men -- the insane addicts of Nazism naturally had another scale of values -- human life and its spiritual products will always be above any strategic or tactical considerations. In the face of the ravings of those who advocate the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances, I shall quote the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, who said that any such person must be "out of his mind". (New York Times, International Edition, 20 July 1964)

Mr. Gomez Robledo, Mexico)

I repeat yet again that this is in line with our firm and constant attitude in our present dire predicament, which, as we see it, permits of no alternative. At the same time, let us not forget that our status as a non-nuclear and non-aligned Power obliges us to "act as a moderating influence" among the major nuclear Powers. We are greatly encouraged in our performance of this function by the fact that our two co-Chairmen have agreed to devote this meeting to the study of this problem. In our view, this agreement fully reflects the desire of the great Powers, and indeed of all the States represented here, to come to an understanding which, in its turn, could serve as the basis of an international undertaking. Hence we consider that we must do all in our power to help those States to reconcile certain differences which, viewed pessimistically, might seem insurmountable.

We should be closing our eyes or our ears to reality -- and the Mexican representative does not wish at any time to play the role of a dummy or of the Stone Guest in the well-known Spanish play -- if we did not recognize that the only visible obstacle at present is the apprehension with which the sociliast countries view the possible creation of a multilateral nuclear force by certain NATO countries.

Aside from the unequivocal statements made here, we have read with the utmost care the notes addressed by the Soviet Government on 11 July to the Governments of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany (ENDC/137). In the first the Soviet Government speaks clearly of "the risk of a thermonuclear conflict" if the Western Powers give the Bundeswehr access to their nuclear forces, and adds that with such a development of events the Soviet Union would be obliged to take the "appropriate measures" which would effectively safeguard their security (ibid., p.3)

These are very serious statements, to say the least, and they confirm us in our sincerely-held view that the non-aligned countries have a duty to urge all the interested parties to meditate in all calm and serenity on each other's arguments. On the one hand it is said that the creation of the multilateral force is the only effective and realistic way of preventing non-nuclear States from obtaining nuclear weapons independently. On the other hand, reference is made, in a manner which even after twenty years still moves us, to the vast and historic experience suffered by so many European peoples who were victims of the aggression of Imperial Germany in 1914 and of National-Socialist Germany in 1939 and subsequently. The arguments of both sides must be pondered with attention and respect.

(Mr. Gomez Robledo, Mexico)

My delegation does not consider that its task at this Conference is to deliver a final verdict on the compatibility or otherwise of multilateral forces with the concept of non-dissemination, with which we are all in agreement; for we are sure that the Mexican views would not affect the position adopted by either side. Nevertheless, it is our duty to point out the danger, as has been done recently in the newspapers, that, if a multilateral nuclear force were to be created -- whoever the creators might be -- other nuclear Powers might in their turn decide to create similar forces. This would certainly alter the balance of power -- or, to put it more bluntly, the balance of terror -- and we should witness the birth of a new arms race which would leave its predecessors in the shade, for it would be a nuclear and multilateral arms race.

Faced with this sombre prospect, which threatens us all equally, we non-nuclear States have the right and the duty to appeal to the wisdom of those who, by virtue of the power at their disposal, are able to place the stamp of good fortune or disaster on the future of mankind. As we see it, the role of the non-aligned countries is like that of the chorus in ancient Greek tragedies, which played no part in the conflict between the protagonists but at all times, as the incarnation of moral conscience, appealed to moderation, temperance and wisdom and, above all, admonished them not to overstep the bounds of the human condition -- that overstepping called by the Greeks hubris and for them the source of all evil. According to one of the great Greek tragedians, the arrogant rise of the ears of corn is followed by the harvest of tears.

We do not believe that those words have lost their validity, nor has the eternal message bequeathed to us by the people who gave form to reason and inner balance, that balance on which the fate of men and States depends much more than on the balance of power. Hence, in the face of all discouragements, let us uphold this conviction as a shield and as a hope.

Mr. THOMAS (United Kingdom): I am particularly glad that I am able to attend today's meeting of the Committee, because the subject on our agenda is the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. I read with much interest the discussion on this question which was held on 2 July, the last occasion when this was the agenda item for the day (ENDC/PV.195). I was not able to be present myself on that occasion, and therefore I specially welcome the opportunity which I now have of emphasizing the importance which Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom attaches to this question.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

Sir Paul Mason has already, on 2 July (ibid., pp.16 et seq.), drawn the attention of the Committee to the debate on foreign affairs which was held in our House of Commons on 16-17 June. I hope, however, I may be forgiven if I again refer to that debate, since I think it shows quite clearly the interest which the British Parliament has in the question of non-dissemination. It also shows without any possible doubt that Her Majesty's Government is convinced of the need for an agreement on non-dissemination. It equally shows that we have no intention of participating in any arrangement which would involve dissemination. I cannot emphasize too clearly our determination on that point.

In that foreign affairs debate both Mr. Butler and I spoke on the question of a non-dissemination agreement. I assured the House of Commons, and I can assure this Committee now, that such an agreement has been -- and remains -- a major objective of my Government's policy (Official Report, Vol.696, No.120, col.1243). I hope that there can be no possible shadow of doubt on that point. This, therefore, is our reply to the question put to the Committee, and in particular to the members of NATO here present, by Mr. Zorin in his speech on 2 July. Mr. Zorin asked whether the Western Powers were ready to conclude "an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, which would really mean closing all channels and ways for their dissemination" (ENDC/PV.195, p.15). Mr. Chairman, you also referred to that question by Mr. Zorin at the close of your remarks on 16 July (ENDC/PV.199, pp.12,13). Today the representative of Bulgaria also posed that question.

Frankly, I confess to being somewhat surprised that it is even thought necessary to put such a question. It is, after all, no new development in my Government's policy that one of its objectives is a non-dissemination agreement. That is clear from statements by Ministers over the years. Mr. Butler referred to the need for such an agreement in the Debate on the Address held on 15 November 1963 -- to go no further back than that (Official Report, Vol.684, cols.508,509). As I have said, both Mr. Butler and I stressed Her Majesty's Government's views on this matter in the foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons last month. Only last week our Prime Minister joined, with the other Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth, in the agreed statement published after their recent meeting, in reaffirming --

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

"... their support for the work of the Geneva Disarmament Conference and their determination to seek to extend the scope of disarmament in accordance with the principles expressed in their statement of 17 March 1961, particularly by endeavouring to promote an agreement to prohibit the further dissemination of nuclear weapons and of

knowledge relating to their manufacture and use". (The Times, 16 July, p.11)

However, I take the present opportunity to emphasize once again our entire readiness to negotiate a non-dissemination agreement as soon as possible.

Here I should like to make clear our views on the idea of a NATO multilateral force, which has been referred to this morning by both the representative of Bulgaria and the representative of Mexico. In Mr. Zorin's speech on 2 July, to which I have already referred, and in the speeches of the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia on the same occasion (ENDC/PV.195), we were given at some length the views of our East European colleagues on the establishment of the multilateral force; and those views were reiterated this morning by the representative of Bulgaria. As Sir Paul Mason reminded the Committee at the same meeting, the United Kingdom has not yet decided to join the multilateral force (ibid., p.17). Mr. Butler said in the debate to which I have already drawn your attention:

"We recognize that the project is intended to serve the twin causes of European integration and Atlantic partnership, and we share the belief that the nuclear defence of Europe is not to be found separate from the United States, but in partnership with them.

"For this reason, and because we want to consider the military aspects further, we are taking part in the discussions on the multilateral force, but we have not yet decided to join the multilateral force. Our discussions are without commitment as to ultimate participation." (Official Report, Vol.696, No.122, col.1131)

I myself gave a similar explanation of our position, and I emphasized -- if I may be so bold as to quote myself:

"Our eventual decision will depend on a number of factors, not least the shape of the proposal when the negotiations are completed. But one thing that one can say quite clearly is that, whatever these proposals are, it is clear that it is not intended that they should involve dissemination". (ibid., col.1236)

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

The reasons why that is so have been made clear to the Conference on a number of occasions. As Mr. Foster said in his speech on 2 July:

"... the arrangements contemplated for the multilateral force would not increase the number of independent nuclear weapon capabilities and are thus consistent with our objective of preventing the spread of such capabilities. Indeed, by offering an alternative to national nuclear weapons programmes, the multilateral force should increase incentives and improve chances for the limitation of national weapon-producing centres." (ENDC/PV.195, p.37)

In his speech as a whole Mr. Foster demonstrated most convincingly that any step which would lead to the dissemination of nuclear weapons would be quite inconsistent with what he described as two basic objectives of United States policy:

"... first, that the energy of the atom should be harnessed for peace, not war;" -- the representative of Mexico also made that point --

"second -- as a corollary --, that the independent capability to use this energy for war should not spread to additional nations." (ibid., p.38)

Those two objectives are fully shared by my own Government. Indeed, all prospective or possible participants in the multilateral force are fully determined to continue to adhere to the principle of non-dissemination.

But, despite the assurances on this point which have been so frequently and so unequivocally given, our East European colleagues continue to express misgivings concerning it. While one may recognize -- as indeed one has to -- that these misgivings exist, I nevertheless still find our East European colleagues' subsequent line of argument somewhat hard to follow. Surely in that case their best course is to conclude a non-dissemination agreement now. This would then ensure that any multilateral force that may be created by the Western Powers would be in accordance with the agreement.

I should like again to remind the Committee that Mr. Butler, during his visit to this Conference on 25 February, said:

"The existence of a formal agreement ... would itself constitute a safeguard against a multilateral force which involved the dissemination of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.169, p. 11)

I elaborated this statement in my speech in the House of Commons on 16 June when I stated my conviction that the interests of the Soviet Union -- and indeed of all our East European colleagues --

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

"... would be best served by an agreement on non-dissemination. That would substitute a precise international agreement for the present de facto coincidence of policies and allay their anxieties, whether well founded or not, about the possible evolution of the multilateral force." (Official Report, Vol.696, No.122, col. 1243)

As I understood the representative of Bulgaria, he said this morning that he could not grasp the logic of this particular point of view; but I would say to him that it is surely self-evident that any arrangements which the members of NATO may subsequently make for our mutual defence would have to be made to conform with any previously-concluded formal agreement on non-dissemination. As Sir Paul Mason told the Conference on 2 July:

"... it is not our practice to sign an agreement which can be shown to be inconsistent with another agreement into which our Government has already entered." (ENDC/PV.195, p.17)

Sir Paul went on to doubt whether any parliamentary government could get away with such a practice, even if it should want to. Of course it could not. Anyone who knows our parliamentary system and the Press of our country must realize that, politically, it would be quite impossible.

Therefore I was glad to notice that Mr. Zorin, in his second speech on 2 July, showed signs of being convinced of our sincerity in this matter. He said then:

"If you believe that a multilateral nuclear force is not contrary to the basic provisions of such an agreement, let us conclude such an agreement straight away, even in spite of the fact that you are thinking of doing something or other over there." (ibid., p.40)

I hope that that remark means that our Soviet colleagues have begun to realize the force of what we on the Western side have been saying in this regard.

Indeed I should perhaps re-emphasize that the condition which Mr. Zorin put on the proposal which I have just quoted is a condition on which we insist just as strongly ourselves. We do not consider that a multilateral force would violate the basic provisions of a non-dissemination agreement. We are fully determined that it should not. In the circumstances I can only echo Mr. Zorin, therefore, in saying this: "Let us conclude such an agreement". This is our unequivocal answer to the question which was put to us by Mr. Zorin and by you, Mr. Chairman.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

I should add that we can give this answer because we do not, of course, accept for one moment the allegations which both you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Zorin have made about those who, you say, "are striving at all costs" to gain access to nuclear weapons (ibid., p.15). Sir Paul Mason, in his reply to Mr. Zorin, has already shown how unfounded we consider such suspicions of the Federal Republic of Germany to be. Despite what was said about this matter by the representative of Bulgaria this morning, I do not wish to enter anew into this aspect. I would rather appeal to our East European colleagues to follow Mr. Zorin in his suggestion that we should work out the basic provisions of a non-dissemination agreement, so that its conclusion can demonstrate how unfounded those allegations are.

I suggest that the time has now come when we should be thinking, not in terms of allegations, but in terms of undertakings and texts. It has become abundantly clear in the course of our discussions here that we are all agreed on the importance of reaching an agreement. Mr. Zorin himself drew attention to this consensus in the Committee and to the fact that --

"... there are some areas of common ground in the positions of the two sides also in regard to the provisions to be included in an international agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons."

(ibid., p. 6)

I urge the Committee that we should develop these areas of common ground and that we should get on towards formulating these provisions.

This is not a matter where time is on our side. The Committee will recall the words of Mr. Trivedi, the then representative of India, when on 12 March he drew the attention of the Committee to the concern which was expressed at the Pugwash Conference held in India earlier this year. He said:

"They felt that the next ten years or so were crucial. If things were allowed to slide during that period, without any check, the world would find itself in the position of having five, six or ten or 'n' countries possessing nuclear weapons. This is a prospect too frightening to contemplate. War by mechanical failure, accident or miscalculation, or even by design, would then be more difficult to prevent, apart from the political, psychological and even blackmail repercussions of such a development." (ENDC/PV.174, p. 16)

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

On the dangers of such a position we are all agreed. Surely it would be much more fruitful to explore the common ground existing between us than to indulge in recriminations. I would appeal to all members of the Committee to give their earnest consideration to this vital question without polemics or emotion, in order that together we may seek to achieve agreement. Such an agreement would be of the utmost benefit to mankind.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): This morning I wish to state briefly the position which the Canadian Government adopts concerning the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. This position has been stated many times in the past. Canada is firmly opposed to any further increase in the number of States having nuclear weapons in their arsenals and having the independent power to use those weapons on their own decision. In order to prevent any further increase in the number of countries in that category, we consider that it is urgent to conclude an appropriate international agreement on non-dissemination which would be binding on nuclear and non-nuclear States alike. My Government believes that the basis for this agreement already exists in the language of United Nations resolution A/RES/1665 (XVI) -- generally referred to as the Irish resolution -- which received the support of all Members of the United Nations when it was adopted in 1961.

Despite the unanimous support which that resolution received at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, no international agreement based on it has been concluded. The main reason for this, so far as our Committee is concerned, is that the Soviet Union and its allies are strongly opposed to certain multinational arrangements which have been made, or are presently contemplated, providing for the participation of several members of the NATO defensive alliance in the creation of a joint nuclear deterrent. The Soviet Union and its allies have been arguing that such arrangements would be contrary to the principle of non-dissemination. As far as the Canadian Government is concerned, arrangements which are at present in effect for the control of nuclear weapons within the Western alliance and arrangements which are presently under discussion are consistent with the terms of the Irish resolution, on which we believe a non-dissemination agreement should be based.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

In the course of our meeting of 2 July, at which the problem of non-dissemination was discussed extensively, Mr. Zorin, then the Soviet representative, asked for the views of Western members of this Committee in the following terms -- this statement by Mr. Zorin has already been quoted, but I should like to repeat it:

"If the Western Powers are really anxious for a positive solution of the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, we are prepared to negotiate on this problem without putting forward any preliminary conditions. However, from the very beginning there must be mutual understanding between us on the main thing: that our common aim is to conclude such an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as would preclude any possibility for their dissemination and would close every loop-hole of access to these weapons to those who do not now possess them ...". (ENDC/PV.195, p.15)

And Mr. Zorin went on to ask the Western delegations whether we were ready to conduct negotiations on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons on that basis. The Canadian delegation welcomes the Soviet representative's offer to enter into early negotiations on this subject. We are ready to accept that offer and hope other countries here represented will also be ready. We were also particularly glad to hear that the Soviet Government does not attach preconditions to entering upon these negotiations.

As I have said, the basis for an agreement on non-dissemination already exists in the terms of the Irish resolution. We favour negotiation in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee of an international agreement which would contain specific provisions that no nuclear Power would hand over control of nuclear weapons to any nation not now possessing them. To make this principle clear, we must define what we mean by "control" and by "possession". The definitions of these two key terms which I should like to offer represent, of course, the Canadian views. I hope that they may serve to clarify the basic issues involved, but they should not be taken by the Committee as legal formulations or suggestions for treaty language.

"Control" over nuclear weapons we define as the independent power and authority of a nation to order a nuclear weapon to be launched. By "possession" of nuclear weapons we mean independent possession, having "control" over them as just defined. "Possession" would imply that the nation either had manufactured

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

the weapons itself or had been given possession and control of them by some other nation. A non-dissemination agreement should provide against either of those things happening. Therefore a non-dissemination agreement should forbid, in accordance with the terms of the Irish resolution, the transmission of the information necessary for the manufacture of such weapons to non-nuclear Powers. It should also prohibit arrangements under which nuclear Powers could transfer or transmit to any individual non-nuclear nation the means and ability to launch nuclear weapons on its own decision. Finally, in our view, the non-dissemination agreement should, as is stated in the Irish resolution, contain parallel obligations which would be assumed by non-nuclear nations that they would "undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control" of nuclear weapons (A/RES/1665 (XVI)).

To clarify Canada's own position in regard to this, I should like to quote a few sentences from the White Paper on Defence which was tabled in our Parliament in March 1964:

"There has never been any serious question of Canada becoming a member of the nuclear club -- that is, one of those nations which by its own national decision can launch nuclear weapons. This ability could be attained only by the national manufacture of nuclear weapons. It is not contemplated."

Mr. Chairman, I hope that if you, as Soviet representative, will study my statement carefully, you will then agree that Canada has given an adequate and favourable response to the question which Mr. Zorin put to us on 2 July (ENDC/PV.195, p.15). We believe that, if the Soviet Union sincerely wishes to stop what Mr. Zorin called all loopholes for the further spread of nuclear weapons, it should participate constructively in the negotiation of an agreement such as I have outlined.

Mr. TIMBERLAKE (United States of America): I have listened with close attention to the thought-provoking statements of other representatives this morning on the subject before us. I agree that it is a subject of the highest importance, not only for this Conference but for the whole of the human race. In particular, I share the hope so eloquently expressed by the representative of Mexico that counsels of reason and moderation will guide us as we search for a solution.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

In 1946, at the end of the Second World War, the United States went to the United Nations with a plan to eliminate all atomic weapons from national arsenals and to bring atomic energy under international controls (Atomic Energy Commission, Official Record of the 1st meeting, pp.7 et seq.). That plan reflected a policy and a determination from which we have not deviated to this day -- that the United States will not disseminate atomic weapons or the knowledge necessary for their manufacture to any nation.

As everyone knows, the United States plan for the international control of atomic energy was not accepted then. Now, eighteen years later, the world is faced with a vastly different reality, a reality which makes the search for a way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons increasingly difficult and increasingly complex. It is also more urgent. This increased difficulty and danger have reinforced the basic policy of my Government against the spread of national nuclear weapon capabilities. My Government still believes that the creation of additional national nuclear weapon capabilities would be detrimental to international peace and security.

This policy has been reflected consistently in the formulation of our domestic legislation, as has already been pointed out this morning; in our support of the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665(XVI)); in our initiative to establish the International Atomic Energy Agency to assist in promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy and to ensure that this assistance does not "further any military purpose" (Statute of the IAEA, Art.II); in our participation in NATO defence arrangements and discussions relating to the multilateral force; and in our advocacy of and participation in the various disarmament-related agreements which have so far been achieved. As Mr. Foster said on 2 July, in each of these cases we have adhered to two basic objectives. These were mentioned by the representative of the United Kingdom earlier this morning, and I shall repeat them. They are:

"... first, that the energy of the atom should be harnessed for peace, not war; second ..., that the independent capability to use this energy for war should not spread to additional nations." (ENDC/PV.195, p.38)

Those two objectives are also reflected in our current proposals before this Conference. Each of these would help in some way to contain the nuclear danger; and I should like to mention five of them very briefly.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

First, the United States has proposed a verified agreement to halt all production of fissionable material for weapon use (ENDC/120). The recent statement by Mr. Foster on this subject (ENDC/PV.191, pp. 6 et seq.) and the submission of the United States working paper on inspection of a fissionable material cut-off (ENDC/134) indicate the seriousness with which my Government views this measure. The implementation of this proposal, preferably with agreement on the related proposal to transfer significant quantities of weapon-grade U-235 to non-weapon purposes (ENDC/109; PV.172, pp.14 et seq.), would inhibit the further spread of nuclear weapons. By limiting the amount of nuclear material available for national nuclear weapon programmes it would reinforce existing incentives against the transfer to other nations of fissionable material for weapon use. The recent cut-backs announced by the Soviet Union (ENDC/131), the United Kingdom and the United States (ENDC/132) are other important steps in this direction.

Second, we have proposed that the Committee explore the question of a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear vehicles (ENDC/120). As I said at our meeting of 9 July, "A freeze undertaken now would in fact have the same effect at any given future time as the destruction of all the weapons to be produced between now and that future time." (ENDC/PV.197, p.5). In addition to stabilizing the current rough military balance while allowing national resources to be used in more constructive ways, such a measure would also tend to restrain proliferation of nuclear delivery vehicles and systems by limiting potential stocks.

Third, we have proposed the physical destruction by the United States and the Soviet Union of an equal number of B-47 and TU-16 bomber aircraft (ENDC/PV.176, pp. 5 et seq.). This is a realistic and serious proposal. It would also prevent the spread of these nuclear delivery vehicles to other States and thereby would help to prevent the danger of the further spread of the weapons themselves.

Fourth, we have urged that all transfers of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes should take place under effective international safeguards (ENDC/120).

Fifth, we have urged that the major nuclear Powers should accept in an increasing number of their peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection as they recommend for others. As the Committee knows, the United States has already set an example in this regard by the recent agreement placing three small nuclear reactors and one large one under IAEA safeguards (ENDC/PV.172, pp.17,18).

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

Each of these measures is important. All would contribute in a concrete way to the achievement of the goal of restraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Together they deal with the two sources of potential proliferation of nuclear weapons. One is the possibility of dissemination by the nuclear Powers of weapons or information, materials or equipment for their manufacture; the second is the development by additional nations of their own capacity to manufacture such weapons.

Too often the statements of certain representatives in this Committee have left the impression that they are concerned only with the danger of dissemination through transfer. I would remind the Committee that, vital though it is that we act soon to curb this danger, the other danger -- that is, the development by additional nations of the capacity to manufacture -- is no less vital and no less urgent.

Mr. Foster also pointed out at our meeting of 2 July that nuclear technology is developing to the point where "it may become substantially easier and less costly for additional countries to engage in the manufacture of nuclear weapons" (ENDC/PV.195, p.33). The large number of power reactors which will soon be installed throughout the world could produce significant amounts of plutonium adaptable for weapon use. Unless international action is taken soon to prevent the diversion of that plutonium to weapon use, the problem will become much more difficult to control.

That is why it is so important that this Committee seek agreement on concrete measures to prevent both kinds of nuclear proliferation. If we wait until the political and psychological barriers which now tend to restrain proliferation have been broken by one or more of the present non-nuclear Powers, still others will feel the pressure to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. International action to curb proliferation may then be too late.

With that in mind, I listened with some surprise and, I may add, with considerable disappointment to the statement by the representative of the Soviet Union at our 195th meeting. That statement is notable for the absence of any recognition that the potential dissemination of weapons by a nuclear Power is only one -- and not necessarily the most urgent -- problem in preventing nuclear proliferation. Anyone reading the verbatim record of that discussion might conclude that the Soviet Union is either unaware of or indifferent to the danger of potential proliferation through the development of a capacity to manufacture such weapons by other countries.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

Fortunately, we have reason to know that that does not reflect accurately the Soviet Union's point of view. What, then, explains the omission from the Soviet statement? The answer, of course, is to be found in the Soviet Union's single-minded preoccupation with the dangers it claims to see in the proposed multilateral force.

Another notable aspect of the Soviet representative's statement at that same meeting was the intemperance of its language in dealing with this matter. I see no need to reply in kind; but it may help to place such remarks in a better perspective if we recall the Soviet Union's statements directed at almost every past indication of progress in developing or strengthening NATO's co-operative defensive capability or progress towards greater European and Atlantic unity. In an effort to block progress towards these goals, each separate step was made to appear in Soviet pronouncements as the forerunner of doom and disaster. Yet life still goes on. World peace has been consolidated, and international tensions have in fact abated. Now it is the multilateral force which is the target of Soviet attacks and, we believe, primarily for the same reasons.

We are not negotiating here on the defence arrangements of either side. However, in view of the delay brought about by these Soviet attacks on the multilateral force, let me reiterate why the Soviet arguments are, in our view, groundless.

We have done everything possible to allay the expressed fear of the Soviet Union that the multilateral force is or could become a disguised form of dissemination of nuclear weapons. In fact, we believe that, by offering an alternative to national nuclear weapon programmes, the multilateral force should increase incentives and improve the prospect for halting the growth in national weapon-producing centres.

The multilateral force is being devised to provide a responsibly-controlled deterrent in the face of a Soviet nuclear threat which includes hundreds of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles aimed at the densely-populated cities and industrial areas of Western Europe. The multilateral force will contribute to meeting this threat in a way which avoids the creation of new national centres of control over nuclear weapons. As we have made clear many times, it is fully consistent with United States policy against proliferation. No single participant would be able to fire the missiles, since firing of missiles in war-time would be by decision of the United States and an agreed number of other participants. Furthermore, no nation participating in the multilateral force could withdraw any element of the force and place it under national control.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

Therefore we feel that the arguments used by the Soviet Union in its attacks on the multilateral force are not justified. It has been and will continue to be the policy of the United States to do nothing that would be incompatible with the supreme task of preserving and strengthening international peace. However, this does not mean that we shall refrain from taking appropriate steps to improve the defences of the United States and its allies as long as countries from which we or our allies might be threatened maintain and continue to improve their armaments.

We believe that the Soviet Union's present concern about the multilateral force will prove as unfounded as its past concern about other steps taken to improve NATO's defences and to strengthen Western unity. Meanwhile, however, this Committee has the opportunity to urge that a non-proliferation agreement be brought into force without further delay. Such an agreement in itself would provide further assurance to allay any Soviet concern.

I have already indicated why we believe there should be no further delay. Every nation represented here has supported such an agreement. On 2 July, as has been pointed out previously, Mr. Zorin noted this consensus and, after reviewing the points of agreement between the positions of the two sides, he said -- and this has been quoted by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Canada: "we are prepared to negotiate on this problem" (ENDC/PV.195, p.15). Unfortunately, however, that statement was preceded by the remark that if the Western Powers wanted a positive solution to the problem they "must renounce the plan to create a NATO multilateral force." (ibid., p.14).

As has previously also been noted, at that same meeting Mr. Zorin asked several questions about our readiness to conclude a non-dissemination agreement (ibid., pp.15,40). The answer of the United States delegation is the same as that given by the delegations of Canada and of the United Kingdom this morning: yes, we have been and we are ready. But is that the real question before this Committee? Or is the question whether the Soviet Union will continue to assume responsibility for preventing the conclusion of an agreement that not only would bar dissemination but would also make possible a world-wide undertaking by non-nuclear Powers against the manufacturing or acquiring of such weapons?

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

Mr. Foster said on 2 July:

"... the United States has been seeking, and will continue to seek, an international agreement under which the nuclear Powers would commit themselves not to transfer nuclear weapons into national control of States not now possessing them, as well as not to assist such States in manufacturing nuclear weapons. Such an agreement would facilitate a parallel undertaking by non-nuclear Powers not to manufacture such weapons and to refrain from acquiring control over such weapons and from seeking or receiving assistance in manufacturing them. An international agreement of this kind would constitute a most important curb on the spread of nuclear weapons, which, if not checked now, may become a serious threat to international peace." (ibid., pp.34,35)

I should like to recall the statement made by Mr. Fisher at our meeting of 2 April, when he asked:

"Is this Conference going to adopt the position that we should refrain from taking the practical, concrete steps now open to us because there is disagreement on the wisdom or practicability of taking other steps as well? Should we do nothing while we debate the wisdom of doing more?" (ENDC/PV.180, p.21)

I hope that is not the case. I hope this Conference will remain in touch with political reality and not become an irrelevancy on the historical international scene. Let us make the only proper choice open to us while there is still time.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translation from Russian):
I wish now to speak in my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet delegation listened with great attention and interest to the convincing statement made by the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Lukanov, who proved in a consistent and well-reasoned manner, and as usual with great force of logic, both the necessity and urgency of solving the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and the incompatibility of the plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force with the solution of this problem.

The statement made today by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Gomez Robledo, seems to us to be very important. He has shown us how perseveringly and resolutely his country -- one of the biggest countries of Latin America -- is carrying on the

(The Chairman, USSR)

struggle for a positive solution to the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons in any form. It seems to us that he has given all the participants in the negotiations a very timely reminder that the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force would start a new and extremely dangerous round in the nuclear arms race, which would involve an even wider circle of States than at present. Mr. Gomez Robledo was undoubtedly right when he urged the participants in the negotiations to think this over seriously.

I now propose to offer our comments on the statements made by the representatives of the Western Powers. We listened attentively to the statement of the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Thomas, in the hope of finding in it some new ideas, a new approach to the solution of the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately we did not find anything new in his statement; but we shall, of course, carefully study in the verbatim record everything that has been said by him today. However, we think it necessary to tell you straight away our first impression from Mr. Thomas's statement.

Although the United Kingdom representative insistently told us that his Government is interested in a positive solution to the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, at the same time he started from the assumption that the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons can be solved without renouncing the plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force. That is the basic flaw which makes the arguments put forward by Mr. Thomas unacceptable.

Mr. Thomas's main idea, as we understood it, was to prove that it is possible at one and the same time to solve the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force in which Western Germany would participate and consequently obtain access to nuclear weapons. But that is impossible. Any agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons that would leave a loop-hole for access to these weapons by West German revenge-seekers, especially by way of a NATO multilateral force, would merely create a dangerous illusion and, what is more, would become a screen for the actual dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is impossible to adopt an intermediate position in this matter. It is necessary to choose between two things: either the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons or their dissemination.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Where the Soviet Union is concerned, we made this choice long ago. We stand for the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and for the conclusion of an international treaty which would close all loopholes permitting access to nuclear weapons to those who do not now possess them. We gathered from the statement made by the United Kingdom representative that his Government, apparently, would like to avoid making this choice. It would like to reconcile what is irreconcilable, to make compatible what is incompatible, to combine what cannot be combined. But that position is also a choice of a kind. Indeed, it is a choice in favour of the dissemination of nuclear weapons in the form of a NATO multilateral nuclear force.

We regret having to mention that in his statement today the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, while advocating the conclusion of an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, at the same time gave such an interpretation to a possible agreement on this subject as to make it appear that it would be directed solely against national possession and control of nuclear weapons but would leave loopholes for access to nuclear weapons by Western Germany through the NATO multilateral nuclear force. We shall, of course, study most carefully the text of Mr. Burns' brief statement; but in listening attentively to that statement we got the same impression as we did from Mr. Thomas's statement: namely, that Mr. Burns would also like to make compatible what is incompatible -- the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force.

Our United States colleagues are making many efforts in the Committee, and particularly outside it, to create the impression that the multilateral nuclear force is the joint offspring of the North Atlantic Alliance and that in the plan for its creation there is apparent in the first place the interest of all the European States members of NATO in being allowed to participate in NATO's nuclear strategy. Today the United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, has again assured us of this.

Let us go into this question and let us see more closely which of the States members of NATO show enthusiasm and an ardent desire in connexion with the plan to create a NATO multilateral force, and which of them show no such enthusiasm. First of all, one is struck by the fact that about half the States members of NATO have refused altogether, although for different reasons,

(The Chairman, USSR)

to participate even in the negotiations on the creation of such a force. That attitude was taken by France; Canada is also not taking part in the negotiations; Norway and Denmark have firmly refused to participate in a NATO multilateral nuclear force. Very characteristic in this regard is the following statement made in June by Mr. Lange, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, which, as we all know, is a member of NATO:

"We do not think that the contemplated multilateral force is necessary for maintaining the military and political balance.

We ... emphasize that we do not consider the idea of creating a multilateral force a good one."

That is just the opposite to what Mr. Timberlake told us today a few minutes ago.

Three other members of NATO are not taking part in the negotiations for the creation of the multilateral force: Iceland, Luxembourg and Portugal. Thus seven out of the fifteen members of NATO do not wish at all to have anything to do with the multilateral force. There remain eight States: the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece and Turkey. Those are the countries participating in the negotiations for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force. Now let us see what are the positions taken by those States in regard to the creation of the NATO multilateral force.

Let us begin with Belgium. It is participating in the negotiations, but with very great reservations. It is characteristic that Belgium has not provided a contingent to form part of the crew of the first experimental ship in the NATO multilateral force, the missile-bearing destroyer "Biddle".

Then there is the United Kingdom. Although it is taking part in the negotiations, it has not yet decided whether it will join the multilateral nuclear force. Quite recently, on 16 July, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Thomas, who is present at our meeting, stated in the foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons:

"We have agreed to take part in an objective examination of the American proposal for a mixed-manned nuclear force" -- that is, the multilateral nuclear force -- "without commitment as to our eventual participation in such a force. That is still our position, and there is no mystery about it." (Official Report, Vol. 696, No. 122, col. 1236)

(The Chairman, USSR)

Mr. Thomas confirmed that in his statement today, emphasizing that the United Kingdom has at present no commitment in regard to the multilateral force. Let us note in this connexion that from the point of view of the maintenance and consolidation of world peace it would be a good thing if the United Kingdom Government kept to its present position in regard to the NATO multilateral nuclear force.

Unfortunately, the statement made by Mr. Thomas today in favour of the NATO multilateral nuclear force does not forebode any good. In his statement today Mr. Thomas did not take the path of developing the points of common interest to us all, as, for instance, the interest of the United Kingdom Government in the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, of which he assured us today. He did the opposite. In defending the NATO multilateral nuclear force, he preferred to take the path which increases the differences between us.

Nevertheless, it is well known that very influential political circles and the greater part of British public opinion are altogether against the United Kingdom's participation in the multilateral nuclear force. According to information which appeared in The Times of London one may conclude that the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence is also against the creation of the NATO multilateral nuclear force. We apologize, of course, to the United Kingdom delegation for seeming to touch upon the internal affairs of their country by speaking about this, and we certainly should never have done so had it not been a matter of such an important problem in present-day international relations as the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons.

I now come to Italy, Mr. Cavalletti. Italy is taking part in the negotiations and has a small contingent in the crew of the destroyer "Biddle". But I think -- and the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, will probably agree with me -- that it would be premature to say that Italy's position in regard to participation in the NATO multilateral nuclear force is a firm one. It is rather the opposite, especially if one takes into account the present trends in the political life of Italy.

As for the position of the Netherlands, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Luns, said on 17 July that his Government had no very great enthusiasm for the multilateral force. He added that it was still unknown whether the Netherlands Government would finally decide to join it or not.

(The Chairman, USSR)

As regards Greece and Turkey, they have been taking part in the negotiations for the creation of a multilateral nuclear force from the very beginning. But they too are, apparently, not showing any particular activity and, frankly speaking, have little time to spare for the NATO multilateral nuclear force, because they do not need it.

Now let us see which countries remain the real enthusiasts for creation of the NATO multilateral nuclear force. There remain only the United States of America -- and even then it is said to be not the Pentagon but the State Department -- and the Federal Republic of Germany. And here we come to the very heart of the matter. The heart of the matter is that, out of all the allies of the United States in NATO, the only one that shows real interest in and real enthusiasm for the creation of the NATO multilateral nuclear force is the Federal Republic of Germany and no one else. That, in fact, is the country for which the multilateral nuclear force is being created. That is the country which needs it. The real enthusiasts for the creation of this force are the West German revenge-seekers and no one else. It is precisely in order to satisfy their craving for nuclear weapons that this force has been devised.

The United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, has said today -- as he has done before -- that the Soviet Union's fears in regard to the NATO multilateral nuclear force are unfounded and unjustified. If we analyse the argumentation used by the representatives of the United States and other Western countries on the question of the NATO multilateral nuclear force in trying to prove that the creation of this force is compatible with a positive solution to the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, it is easy to see that they put forward two main theses.

Here is the first thesis. The representatives of the Western Powers members of NATO allege that within the framework of the NATO multilateral nuclear force Western Germany and other non-nuclear participants in this force would not obtain access to nuclear weapons. They would have the possibility, so to speak -- using the metaphorical language of the propagandists of the Western Powers -- of merely putting their fingers on the safety catch but not on the trigger of nuclear weapons.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Now for the second thesis. The representatives of the United States and other Western countries try to persuade us that the inclusion of Western Germany in the NATO multilateral nuclear force is the "last concession" to Western Germany and that in the future there will be no more concessions in the direction of granting Western Germany more direct access to nuclear weapons.

As regards the first of the two theses, the so-called safety-catch and the trigger: in the statement of our delegation at the meeting on 2 July, as well as in the statements of other delegations, numerous irrefutable facts were cited which show the specious, spurious nature of the argument (ENDC/PV.195. In reality, within the framework of the NATO multilateral force it is, of course, not only to the safety-catch of this force that the West German revenge-seekers are being given access. It would be incredibly naïve to suppose that it was for the sake of putting its finger on the safety-catch of the NATO nuclear force that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany declared its readiness to defray 40 per cent of the total expenditure involved in the organization and maintenance of the NATO international force.

If nothing more were concerned than giving Western Germany the right to put its finger on the safety-catch, for this purpose there would be no need at all to create the NATO multilateral nuclear force; for this purpose a meeting at NATO Headquarters would be sufficient, and for this purpose there is, of course, no need to train West German military specialists in handling nuclear weapons in this NATO multilateral force. West German specialists attached to units of the multilateral nuclear force will have access to nuclear weapons and will be trained in the technique of using them and not, as some are trying to persuade us here, in how not to use them.

It is clear that it is not a question of giving the West German Bundeswehr the right to veto the use of nuclear weapons. For this purpose, I repeat, there would have been no need for the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to agree to defray 40 per cent of the total expenditure involved in the creation and maintenance of the NATO multilateral nuclear force; nor would it have needed to be so anxious to send its contingents in order to include West German military personnel in this NATO multilateral force. Obviously it is a question of giving Western Germany access to nuclear weapons, and nothing else.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Not one of the facts which we have cited has been refuted or even shaken in the statements made today by the representatives of the Western Powers. These facts cannot be shaken, because they correspond to the actual reality, no matter how certain delegations may strive to conceal it.

Today we deem it necessary to dwell in rather more detail on the second of the aforesaid theses of the representatives of the Western Powers: the assertion that the inclusion of Western Germany in the NATO multilateral nuclear force is the last, the very last, concession to West German militarism and revenge-seeking and that this will be the end of the whole affair. We wish to state straight out and emphatically, here in the Committee, that this thesis is just as artificial and false as the allegation that the participation of West German revenge-seekers in the NATO multilateral nuclear force does not give Western Germany access to nuclear weapons.

Allow me, first of all, to say that we have already heard more than once this refrain about the "last concession". Ten years ago, when the Paris military agreements were being concluded which admitted Western Germany to the North Atlantic Alliance and defined the way in which Western Germany was to be re-militarized, at all international gatherings and from every international platform we heard only soothing statements by representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other members of NATO, as well as by representatives of Western Germany itself, to the effect that this really was the "last concession". The Governments of the Western Powers at that time tried to persuade the whole world that it was merely a question of a strictly limited rearmament of Western Germany. The restrictive clauses of the Paris agreements were represented at that time as something unshakeable, eternal, as providing a reliable safeguard against the possibility of a rebirth of aggressive militarism in Western Germany.

The Soviet Government, like the governments of many other States, pointed out at the time that the Paris agreements actually opened to some extent the door to the rearmament of Western Germany. And the Soviet Union has been proved one hundred per cent right. Only ten years have passed, but look at what is left of all those restrictive clauses of the Paris agreements. All, or almost all, of the restrictions laid down in the Paris agreements have long since lost their force and have long been abrogated; and this has been done by those very same Western Powers at the demand of the West German revenge-seekers.

(The Chairman, USSR)

I will cite facts in confirmation of this. Under the Paris agreements Western Germany was prohibited from manufacturing ballistic missiles and guided missiles. This prohibition was publicized in every possible way by the Governments of the Western Powers, which tried to make it appear that the Federal Republic of Germany would never be able to create its own missile forces. Yet in April 1958 the first step was taken in this direction. The Council of Western European Union permitted Western Germany to manufacture anti-tank missiles. These were short-range missiles; but in October 1959 the Council of the Western European Union went even further and permitted Western Germany to manufacture "ground-to-air" and "air-to-air" missiles.

Since then the designing and manufacture of combat missiles in Western Germany has been developed at full speed. It is well known that the Federal Republic of Germany now has a widely-developed missile industry. Only a year ago the West German firm "Waffen Luftrüstung AG" tested a multi-stage ballistic missile. This firm declared after these tests that it was prepared to carry out orders for the manufacture of any system of tactical missiles. But who does not know that, if any particular State is capable of manufacturing multi-stage tactical missiles with a range of hundreds of kilometres, it will no longer have any great difficulty in organizing the manufacture of strategic missiles on that same production basis? That is the first fact.

Here is the second fact. The Paris agreements prohibited Western Germany from manufacturing certain classes of warships, including destroyers with a displacement of over 3,000 tons and submarines with a displacement of over 350 tons. This restriction was represented as an obstacle to the resurrection of a powerful, aggressive German fleet, which was one of the main instruments of the German aggressors in both world wars. But already in May 1961 the Council of the Western European Union permitted Western Germany to build eight destroyers, each of them with a displacement of up to 6,000 tons. In October 1962 the Council of the Western European Union took a decision which gave Western Germany the right to build submarines with a displacement of up to 450 tons, and in October 1963 another decision which sanctioned the construction in Western Germany of six submarines with a displacement of up to 1,000 tons. The purpose of the abrogation of the restrictions on the construction of destroyers and submarines of high tonnage --- and no secret has been made of this by the leading circles of NATO and Western Germany --- was to give Western Germany the opportunity to create a surface and submarine fleet equipped with missiles.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Here is the third fact. Under the Paris agreements Western Germany was allowed to create armed forces comprising twelve divisions. At present these twelve divisions have been created, but their composition, to the surprise of some naïve people who expected that they would be a comparatively small, compact armed force, is now already close on half a million officers and other ranks. The West German Bundeswehr is at the present time the largest army in Western Europe and is also the best equipped. The Bundeswehr is equipped with Pershing, Sergeant and Honest John missiles, Matador and Mice guided missiles, as well as a whole series of other very up-to-date weapon systems. The Bundeswehr now has its military depots, training camps and testing grounds not only in the territory of Western Germany but also in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and a number of other countries members of NATO.

But it is not only a question of the Bundeswehr. In addition to the Bundeswehr, in Western Germany there is going on at full speed the recruiting of troupes for so-called "territorial defence", the total numbers of which, apparently, will also amount to hundreds of thousands of men.

What, then, is happening? What is happening is that within the framework of NATO Western Germany is developing in peace-time a multilateral armed force such as Hitlerite Germany did not develop until after the beginning of the Second World War. The armaments of the present-day Bundeswehr have been completely modernized. All this, of course, costs money, but the West German revenge-seekers have it, and even more of it than a quarter of a century ago. At the present time the military budget of Western Germany already exceeds the military budget of Hitlerite Germany.

What, then, is left of the so widely publicized Paris agreements? The restrictive clauses have been abrogated one after another and have sunk into oblivion. Western Germany has secured the possibility to create again an aggressive and powerful military force. It is true that the prohibition, laid down in the Paris agreements, of the manufacture by Western Germany of its own nuclear weapons still remains in force. But it is now intended to circumvent even this prohibition -- the last prohibition, so to speak -- by creating the NATO multilateral nuclear force and giving the West German Bundeswehr access to nuclear weapons through its participation in this force.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Do not take us for naïve people; do not try to persuade us that the multilateral nuclear force is the last concession. Yes, it really is the last concession, because there is in fact nothing more to concede, because through the NATO multilateral force Western Germany is obtaining access to nuclear weapons. Thus begins the liberation of Western Germany from the last restriction. At one of the previous meetings of the Committee we quoted a dispatch from Reuter's agency that within less than five years the West German Government will be able to have its own nuclear weapons. That short period mentioned by the West German Minister is an extremely eloquent admission that in this regard Western Germany no longer has nothing to go on but obviously has already a far-advanced scientific, technical, military and industrial basis for creating its own nuclear weapons.

It cannot be doubted that the creation of the NATO multilateral nuclear force is the ominous beginning of a course aimed at starting a new round in the nuclear arms race on a so-called multilateral basis. But this in its turn, Mr. Thomas and Mr. Timberlake, will give a stimulating jolt to the intensification of the race for national nuclear armaments as well. This dangerous process must be stopped. In order to do so, we must set about solving the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the real non-dissemination of nuclear weapons without delay and in real earnest, and work out an agreement which would close all channels, direct and indirect, to the dissemination of nuclear weapons, whether it be through national or through multilateral possession and control of these weapons of mass destruction. That is what must be done; that is what we must set about.

As I expected, I have now, in my capacity as Chairman, to call on the United Kingdom representative, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. THOMAS (United Kingdom): The time is now twenty-five minutes past one, and I know that members of the Committee would like to adjourn. Therefore, I do not intend to speak for more than about one-and-a-half minutes. However, I could not let this opportunity pass without saying, Mr. Chairman, that the only comfort I gained

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

from the speech you have just delivered on behalf of the Soviet Union was that you said you would study the speeches which were made by my colleagues of the West and myself. I hope that when you have studied those speeches you will appreciate not only that some of the preliminary remarks you made were a very sad misinterpretation of what we said, but also that you yourself have adopted an attitude which is inflexible and one which, I say with respect, is a backward step from the attitude apparently taken by Mr. Zorin when he was here.

Permit me to say that I regret that you seized the opportunity to make an intemperate attack on the Federal Republic of Germany. I am sorry you did not in fact appreciate that in my speech I made a positive reply to a question which was put by Mr. Zorin. I would ask you, when you consider what has been said this morning, to look again at what Mr. Zorin said on 2 July. I should like to quote the translation. He said:

"We said that it was necessary to conclude such an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as would preclude any possibility for [their] dissemination, and would close every loophole of access to these weapons to those who do not now possess them but are striving at all costs to gain direct or at least indirect access to them, either by establishing their own national control over nuclear weapons or by participating within the framework of military alliances in the possession, disposition and control of them.

"If you believe that a multilateral nuclear force is not contrary to the basic provisions of such an agreement, let us conclude such an agreement straight away, even in spite of the fact that you are thinking of doing something or other over there. Let us conclude an agreement on this basis. We still have not had a reply to the question: are the Western Powers prepared to negotiate on this basis?" (ENDC/PV.195, p.40)

I must say that, having received a positive reply to Mr. Zorin's question from me and other Western representatives this morning, you seem prepared to throw that reply out of the window, and in the course of your speech you did not even mention the possibility of negotiations. I hope that you will consider what has been said and that in future discussions on this subject there will be a more flexible attitude demonstrated by the Soviet Government; otherwise, I say with great respect, your responsibility in this matter will be a very heavy one.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

I should like to reply to you, Mr. Thomas, in the same vein, and ask you to study carefully what we have said today and what we have said at previous meetings concerning the incompatibility of the creation of the multilateral nuclear force with the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

If we talk about the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, let us approach the subject conscientiously that is, so that there shall be no dissemination either in a direct or an indirect form. What you have told us today is your old position, according to which you consider that you will go on with the creation of the multilateral nuclear force, and at the same time you say that we must reach agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. These two things are incompatible. I do not think that anyone has any doubt about this except you and your colleagues who have spoken on this subject here.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as Soviet representative you spoke again today about non-dissemination and the multilateral nuclear force, without -- as the United Kingdom representative has just observed -- replying to the positive and specific questions which were put to you. You still see a contradiction between a non-dissemination agreement and the multilateral nuclear force. But this time you extended the scope of your examination: you even gave a detailed review of the political situation which you believe to exist in each NATO country, including Italy, in regard to the creation of the multilateral nuclear force.

First of all, I should like to point out that one of the advantages, and also one of the drawbacks, of free governments is that all may without fear of espionage follow the efforts made for their security and defence. Everyone can follow the way in which the popular will is freely affirmed and established in open public debate. Everyone can learn how governments observe and carry out the popular will. To be sure, that can be interpreted in all manner of ways. The interpretation you have just given of the Italian people's wishes in the matter of participation in the multilateral nuclear force is entirely your own personal affair.

The true position of the Italian Government, whose mouthpiece and representative I am, was set forth by me on 2 July and is to be found in the verbatim record of that meeting. That position is very clear and is open to all. Mr. Tsarapkin's

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

interpretation of the Italian position leads me to remind you of what I said at the above meeting:

"For its part, Italy states yet again its firm intention of reaching as soon as possible a non-dissemination agreement in accordance with the terms of the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665 (XVI)).

"... the multilateral force currently being studied will have to be in accordance with the Irish resolution. Italy voted for the latter with the sincere and firm intention of abiding by it. We should like this resolution to be transformed into a firm and formal undertaking as soon as possible."

(ENDC/PV.195, page 43).

That is the Italian position.

Whether the Soviet delegation likes it or not, it will be for the Italian people to decide freely at the proper time, whether they want to join the multilateral nuclear force -- or indeed to select the most appropriate method of safeguarding their security and guaranteeing peace. But I wish to repeat here and now that we are ready to negotiate and conclude here an agreement on non-dissemination.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

In my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union I should like to inform the Committee that, in accordance with the programme of work announced on 16 July (ENDC/PV.199, pp.37,38) the delegation of the Soviet Union suggests that the topic for discussion by the Committee at the meeting on 30 July be the reduction of military budgets. In this connexion we should like to express the opinion that, in view of the extreme urgency and importance of the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, it would be useful to continue the discussion of this topic also at the meeting of the Committee on 30 July. The Committee's procedure allows this to be done, since it gives every delegation the right to raise and discuss any topic at any meeting of the Committee. As for the Soviet delegation, it intends, at the meeting of 30 July, to avail itself of the opportunity to reply in greater detail to the statements made today by representatives of the Western Powers on the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 201st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador S.K. Tsarapkin, representative of the Soviet Union.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, the Soviet Union and Italy.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 28 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.

